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THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ADMINISTRABILITY DEFEATS
REASONABLENESS IN THE APPLICATION OF ARREST LAW
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001)
Melissa Fernandez*
A City of Lago Vista police officer arrested Petitioner for failure to
wear a seatbelt while driving, and for failure to fasten seatbelts on her
small children.' Petitioner filed a claim against Respondents2 under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, 3 asserting that Respondents violated Petitioner's Fourth
Amendment "right to be free from unreasonable seizure.",4 Upon removal
to federal court,5 the trial court granted Respondents summary judgment
in light of Petitioner's admission that she violated the seatbelt statute, and
that the arrest was consistent with the law.6 A panel of the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed, reasoning that an arrest for a seatbelt offense
was unreasonable. Sitting en banc, the Court of Appeals vacated the
* To my mother, Frances, whose strength and courage have taught me how to accomplish
any goal. And to my flanc6 and number one fan, Chris, whose love is my guiding light.
1. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 323-24 (2001). The officer arrested
Petitioner based on the Texas seatbelt statute, which requires drivers to wear seatbelts in cars
equipped with such, and to fasten seatbelts on small children riding in the front. Id. at 523 (citing
TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 545.413(a)-(b) (1999)). A peace officer may arrest, without a warrant,
any individual who violates these provisions. Id. (citing TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 543.001
(1999)). However, the officer may issue a fine between $25 and $50 in place of the arrest. Id. (citing
TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. §§ 543.003-.005, 545.413(d) (1999)).
2. Id. at 325. Respondents in this action include the City of Lago Vista, Chief of Police
Frank Miller and Officer Bart Turek. Id.
3. Id. Section 1983 provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
4. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 325.
5. Id. Petitioner originally filed suit in Texas state court. Id.
6. Id.

7. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 165 F.3d 380, 387 (5th Cir. 1999). The panel found
Petitioner's arrest, premised on the first offense of a seatbelt statute, to be an extraordinary seizure
which required application of a balancing test in order to analyze the reasonableness of the arrest. Id.
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panel's decision, finding the arrest justifiable because the officer had
probable cause and did not conduct the arrest in an extraordinary manner.8
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, 9 affirmed the en banc
decision, and HELD, that an officer may arrest an individual for
committing a minor criminal offense, without violating the Fourth
Amendment, if there is probable cause that the violation occurred in the
officer's presence."'
The Fourth Amendment safeguards the right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures.'" Traditionally, the existence of2
probable cause establishes the reasonableness of a seizure, or arrest,1
without a warrant.' 3 The Court in Terry v. Ohio, 4 however, fashioned a
limited exception 5 to the probable cause standard by finding some
searches constitutional when based solely on a balancing test. 16 In Terry,
the Court analyzed whether a limited weapons search, without probable
cause, was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.17 Terry involved an
officer who frisked petitioner upon the officer's suspicion that petitioner
was armed and was about to rob a store.' 8 The frisk revealed a hidden
8. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 195 F.3d 242, 244 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Whren v.
United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818 (1996)).
9. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 326. The Supreme Court granted certiorari based on the question
of whether a warrantless arrest for misdemeanor criminal offense violates the Fourth Amendment.
id.
10. Id. at 354.
11. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment provides as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
Id.
12. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 436-37 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(stating that arrests fall within the Fourth Amendment definition ofseizure (citing ExparteBurford,
7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 448 (1806))).
13. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 (1979) (explaining the role of probable
cause as the minimum requirement designated to satisfy the Fourth Amendment's dictate that an
arrest be reasonable).
14. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
15. Id. at 27. The Court limited the ruling in Terry to reach only a frisk for weapons, without
probable cause, of an individual who an officer suspected was armed. Id.
16. See id. at 30-31.
17. Id. at 15.
18. Id. at 5-7. The officer testified that he observed the petitioner and another suspect
engaged in questionable behavior as the two men inspected and explored the store while conferring
with each other. Id. at 6. The officer believed that the two men were "casing ajob, a stick-up," and
feared that they were armed. Id. When the officer approached the petitioner and the other suspect
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revolver, 19 which lead to petitioner's conviction for carrying a concealed
weapon.20
The Court held that a limited search for weapons, in the absence of
probable cause, is reasonable when the government's interests in crime
prevention and officer safety outweigh the individual's privacy interest.
The Court first clarified that the judiciary's role is to guard constitutional
liberties from police misconduct.22 In determining the reasonableness of
police searches, the Court concluded that the proper test requires balancing
the need to search with the impact the search has on the person.23 Proper
application of the Fourth Amendment, the Court further stressed, considers
the reasonableness of the search in view of the specific facts' surrounding
the incident.2
In Whren v. UnitedStates,26 however, the Court limited the availability
of the balancing test espoused in Terry to circumstances involving an
extraordinary seizure. 27 Whren gave occasion for the Court to examine the
reasonableness of the temporary seizure of a motorist, based solely on
probable cause that he violated a traffic law.28 In that case, an officer
patrolling a high crime area stopped and detained petitioners, whom the
officer suspected were involved in a crime, for a traffic violation. 29 The
officer then discovered crack cocaine in the car.30 On appeal for conviction
of drug charges, 3 ' petitioners argued that officers use traffic violations as

to investigate the situation and to speak with them, the men responded to the officer by
"mumbl [ingJ something." Id. at 7. Thereafter, the officer spun the petitioner around and proceeded
with the pat down, which lead to the discovery of the revolver. Id.
19. Id. The prosecution introduced the revolver as evidence at petitioner's trial. Id. at 5.
20. Id. at 4-5. Terry waived his right to a trial by jury and pleaded not guilty. Id. at 8.
21. Id. at 30.
22. Id. at 15.
23. Id. at 20-21 (quoting Camara v. Mun. Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 534-35, 536-37 (1967)).
24. Id. at 21. Terry, thus, signaled a case-by-case approach in determining the reasonableness
of searches and seizures pursuant to the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Robinson, 414
U.S. 218, 239 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (explaining the principle Terry embodies).
25. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. In evaluating the facts specific to the case, the Court applied an
objective standard that considered whether a reasonable person in the officer's position would deem
the search an appropriate course of action. Id. at 22 (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132
(1925); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96-97 (1964)).
26. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
27. See id. at 818.
28. Id. at 808.
29. Id. at 808-09. The police officer observed the two occupants of the vehicle waiting at a
stop sign for an unusual amount of time as the driver looked down into the passenger's lap. Id. at
808. The police officer had the opportunity to stop the vehicle when the vehicle turned right without
signaling, and drove off at an unreasonable speed. Id.
30. Id. at 809.
31. Id. The court convicted petitioners of federal drug charges, and petitioners appealed the
denial of a motion to suppress the drugs seized during the traffic stop. Id.
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an excuse to investigate crime, and thus, a balancing test should be applied
to the probable cause requirement in order to limit the officers'
in addition
32
authority
In rejecting petitioners' argument, the Court held that the
reasonableness of a search or seizure is certain in the presence of probable
cause, 33 and that a balancing analysis is appropriate only when the search
or seizure is conducted in an extraordinary manner. 34 Nonetheless, the
Court expressed that there may be "rare exceptions" where the
reasonableness of a search or seizure based on probable cause may be
doubted,35 thus compelling a balancing test.36 However, the Court did not
define what circumstances give rise to such an exception. 7
Notwithstanding Whren 's rulin& the Court in Wyoming v. Houghton3 8
conducted a balancing test 39 even though the search at issue in Houghton
was based on probable cause, 40 and was not conducted in an extraordinary
manner.4 ' At issue in Houghton was whether searching a passenger's
purse, which was located inside a vehicle that officers had probable cause
to believe contained illegal drugs, violated the Fourth Amendment. 42 In
assessing the constitutionality of the search, the Court fashioned a twoprong test that first analyzes whether the common law regarded the search
lawful under the Fourth Amendment.43 If the answer is ambiguous, the
Court stated, the next step is to conduct a balancing analysis to determine
the reasonableness of the search. 44

32. Id. at 810. Petitioners were concerned with limiting the officer's subjective intent in
conducting the traffic stop. Id.
33. Id. at 817.
34. Id. at 818. The Court went on to list a series of cases, including Tennessee v. Garner,471
U.S. 1, 3 (1985) (dtiscussing seizure using deadly force), and Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927
(1995) (discussing unannounced entry into home), to illustrate examples of what the Court
considered searches or seizures conducted in an extraordinary manner. Whren, 517 U.S. at 818.
35. Id. at 817.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. 526 U.S. 295 (1999).
39. Id. at 303-05.
40. Id. at 300, 302. The Court established that the officer's probable cause to search the
vehicle attached to the purse therein by virtue of it being in the vehicle. Id. at 302.
41. See id. at 297-98 (describing the circumstances of the search).
42. Id. at 297. An officer searched petitioner's purse subsequent to stopping the vehicle she
was traveling in for speeding and driving with a broken brake light. Id. at 298. When the driver
stepped out of the car, the officer noticed a syringe in the driver's pocket. Id. The young man
admitted to using the syringe to take drugs. Id. The officer then searched the car and containers
therein, including petitioner's purse, believing that there were drugs in the vehicle. Id.
43. Id. at 299 (citing Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931 (1995)).
44. Id. at 299-300 (citing Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652-53 (1995)).
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In applying the first prong of the test, the Court found that history
supports the lawful search of containers found within a vehicle that police
have probable cause to search. 45 Justice Breyer highlighted in the
concurrence, however, that history's approval of such searches should not
be the sole factor in determining the issue of reasonableness under the
Fourth Amendment. 46 Even though the Court established historical
support,47 it proceeded to the next step by applying a balancing test. 48 The
Court ruled that the government's interest in recovering contraband hidden
by a driver in a passenger's belongings outweighs the passenger's
expectation of privacy.4 9 The Court also wanted to facilitate law
enforcement by providing officers a bright-line rule, fashioned to fit the
general number of cases regarding passenger property.50
In the instant case, the Court relied on the first prong of the Houghton
test, and concluded that history supports warrantless misdemeanor
arrests. 5 ' However, unlike Houghton,the instant Court declined to proceed
with a balancing test to ascertain the reasonableness of the arrest.5 2 Instead,
the instant Court applied the Whren doctrine, limiting the application of the
balancing analysis to searches or seizures conducted in an extraordinary

45. Id. at 300-01. The Court recounted the history of legislation from 1789 to 1799 and
throughout the Founding Era, which authorized customs officials to search ships or vessels that
officials had probable cause to believe contained goods subject to the imposition of a duty tax. Id.
(citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 150-53 (1925)). Officers, thus, can legally search for
concealed contraband within containers in a vehicle as long as the officers have probable cause to
search the vehicle. Id. at 300 (quoting Carroll,267 U.S. at 153).
46. Il. at 307 (Breyer, ., concurring); see also United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411,443
(1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 678 (1970))
(discussing that the mere presence of a statute or historical practice does not support excusing a
violation of the Constitution).
47. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
48. Houghton, 526 U.S. at 303.
49. Id. at 304.
50. Id. at 305-06. A few other cases also have preferred to provide officers with bright-line
rules to facilitate law enforcement in lieu of advocating case-by-case adjudication. See Colorado
v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 376 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (explaining the importance of
expressly allowing officers to conduct inventory searches of impounded vehicles to provide law
enforcement with a clear rule and eliminating the need for officers to rely on their limited discretion
and expertise); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981) (expressing the need for readily
administrable rules regarding a search incident to lawful custodial arrests to simplify officers'
decisions in the field); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (declining to apply
case-by-case adjudication and preferring instead to give officers clear authority to search a person
incident to a lawful arrest in order to facilitate quick ad hoc judgments made by police).
51. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 334-35 (2001) (citations omitted).
52. Id. at 354 (citing Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 (1979)).
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manner 5 3 and like Houghton,preferred a4 bright-line rule for misdemeanor
arrests for the sake of administrability
In crafting its analysis, the instant Court first considered whether
warrantless misdemeanor arrests were historically permissible.55 A review
of English and American common law, the instant Court discovered,
pointed to opposing views regarding the propriety of warrantless
misdemeanor arrests. 56 Thus, the instant Court rejected Petitioner's
argument that the common law clearly limited warrantless misdemeanor
arrests 57 to offenses constituting a breach of the peace.5 8 Moreover, the
instant Court was persuaded that the better interpretation of the common
law supports the practice of warrantless misdemeanor arrests.59
The next part of the analysis addressed the viability of Petitioner's
suggested modem arrest rule banning a custodial arrest, even upon
probable cause, when conviction can result in jail time and when the
government has no compelling need in detaining the individual.6 The
instant Court rejected Petitioner's rule requiring a balancing test,6' holding
that such case-by-case application would impede the efficient
administrability of law enforcement.6 2 Officers taking ad hoc measures, the

53. Id. at 354.
54. Id. at 350.
55. Id. at 327-28.

56. Id. at 328-32. The instant Court analyzed English legal treatises by Sir William
Blackstone and Sir Edward East, which seemed to support Petitioner's view. Id. at 329-30 (citing
WILuAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 149 (1769); EDWARD HYDE
EAST, PLEAS OFTHE CROWN § 71, at 303 (1803)). These treatises, however, highlighted the fact that
a breach of the peace was enough to justify misdemeanor arrests, but did not advocate that such
breach was a requirement. See id. at 300. However, the instant Court also found a treatise
supporting Petitioner's view that the common law limited warrantless misdemeanor arrests to
breaches of the peace. Id. at 329-30. Namely, the instant Court highlighted a treatise by James
Fitzjames Stephen indicating that the common law did not allow misdemeanor arrests except in
matters involving breaches of the peace. Id. at 329 (citing JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY
OFTHE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 193 (1883)). Opposing Petitioner's stance, the instant Court

reviewed a treatise by Sir Matthew Hale, which articulated that a constable could arrest an
individual without a warrant for breach of the peace and some misdemeanors. Id. at 330 (citing
MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OFTHE PLEAS OFTHE CROWN 88 (1736)). As to American support

for Petitioner's argument, the instant Court found none. Id. at 336. Moreover, the instant Court
believed that the Framers ofthe Constitution would have approved warrantless misdemeanor arrests
since an act of Congress, following the ratification of the Fourth Amendment, gave federal marshals
the same powers as local police to conduct warrantless misdemeanor arrests. Id. at 339.
57. Id. at 327.

58. Id. at 332. The instant Court assumed that for purposes of common-law arrest, "breach
of the peace" meant a threat of violence. Id. at 328 n.2.
59. Id. at 332.
60. Id. at 345-46.
61. Id. at 345.

62. Id. at 347. The instant Court maintained that endorsing such a case-by-case approach
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instant Court reasoned, need bright-line rules to guide their conduct.63
Further, the instant Court determined that it is preferable to allow officers
to choose between issuing a citation and executing a lawful arrest, as
opposed to going forward with the arrest and having to address its
lawfulness in court.6 Here, the instant Court focused on curtailing
litigation.65
In concluding its analysis, the instant Court emphasized that general
treatment of arrest law under the Fourth Amendment would nonetheless be
subject to specific evaluation if the officer conducted the arrest in an
extraordinary manner.66 Drawing on Whren however, the instant Court held
that Petitioner's seatbelt arrest, though "inconvenient and embarrassing,"
was not extraordinary. 67
The dissent criticized the majority for not balancing the relevant factors,
and for sacrificing reasonableness for the administrability of law
enforcement. 68 Relying on the principles embodied by Terry, the dissent
emphasized that the nucleus of Fourth Amendment analysis draws on the
reasonableness of all facts surrounding the arrest. 69 Hence, the dissent
balanced the intrusion on Petitioner's privacy against the state's interest in
compelling Petitioner's appearance at court and in enforcing child safety
laws. 70 The fact that the state's interests could be equally served by a fine
troubled the dissenting judges in accepting that the same offense could be
punished by arrest in the absence of intervening considerations. 7' Relying
on probable cause alone, the dissent concluded, would result in punishment
disproportional to the offense.72
The instant Court's holding marks a departure from the judiciary's
traditional role in guarding constitutional liberties, 73 and weakens Fourth

would allow every decision made by police officers on the street to be constitutionally challenged.
Id. (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-35 (1973)).
63. Id. (citing New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454,458 (1981)).
64. Id. at 350.

65. See id. at 347.
66. Id. at 352-53 (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818 (1996)).

67. Id. at 355.
68. Id. at 361 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 366 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106,
108-09 (1977) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968))).

70. Id. at 364-65 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
71. Id. at 365 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor reasoned that in the absence of
any risk of flight, for example, arresting the offender would be unreasonable. Id. (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
72. Id. at 364 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor further explained that giving
police officers unlimited authority to arrest for a fine-only offense would result in an unreasonable
application of search and seizure law. Id. at 364-66 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).

73. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 15 (1968) (discussing traditional responsibilities of courts
under the holding).
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Amendment protection in favor of easing law enforcement. 74 Even though
the Terry rule is limited to searches conducted without probable cause,75
the Fourth Amendment principles that Terry embodies, namely case-bycase adjudication and balancing competing interests, are nonetheless
essential in every Fourth Amendment analysis. 76 Thus, the Court should
have adhered to the fundamental constitutional tenets established by Terry
and considered the specific circumstances surrounding Petitioner's seatbelt
arrest in ascertaining its reasonableness. 77 Rather than deferring to the
Constitution, however, the instant Court deferred to the collective
treatment of arrests to increase administrability. 78 Instead of relying on the
facts of the instant case, the instant Court relied on a historical study of the
acceptance of misdemeanor arrests at common law. 79 The historical
analysis is faulty in two respects. First, the instant court admitted to
common-law disagreement regarding misdemeanor arrests, 0 yet concluded

74. See Atwater, 532 U.S. at 361 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor called attention to the fact that the instant Court acknowledged Petitioner's constitutional right to be free from
"pointless... confinement," yet did not protect Petitioner's right. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Rather, the instant Court preferred to decrease constitutional challenge of such "pointless...
confinement" to allow for easily administrable rules in the field. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
75. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
76. See Atwater, 532 U.S. at 366 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor commented
on Terry's faithfulness to the "Fourth Amendment's command of reasonableness and sensitivity to
the competing values protected by that Amendment." Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 361 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295,300
(1999)). Balancing the relevant interests involved in the case would satisfy the Fourth Amendment
principle that the specific circumstances of each case be considered in order to establish
reasonableness. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). But see United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218,
235 (1973) (expressing that case-by-case adjudication is not supported by historical practice).
78. See Atwater, 532 U.S. at 361 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
79. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. The instant Court relied on the historical
analysis of the common law without regard to modem Fourth Amendment application. In United
States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411,438 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting), forexample, Justice Marshall
suggested that the majority's unquestionable reliance on the common-law rule favoring warrantless
felony arrests failed to analyze the impact that such a rule would have on modem felony arrests.
Noting the differences between common-law felonies, premised on the forfeiture of land, and
modem felonies, based on the corresponding penal punishment, Justice Marshall reasoned that
common-law application to modem felonies would not fit today's constitutional interpretation. Id.
at 438-40 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Justice Marshall's dissent also sheds light
on the fact that misdemeanor offenses, at issue in the instant case, were also different at the common
law in comparison to today's misdemeanor offenses. Id. at 440 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting
Horace L. Wilgus, Arrest Without a Warrant,22 MiCH. L. REV. 541,572-73 (1924) (discussing that
misdemeanors at common law included assault with intent to rob, murder or rape, abortion,
compounding felonies, escaping lawful arrest, forcible and violent entry, and kidnapping, to name
but a few)).
80. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 332. The instant Court expressly announced that "[they found]
disagreement, not unanimity, among both the common-law jurists and the text-writers who sought
to pull the cases together and summarize accepted practice." Id.
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that history supports the practice by preferring one interpretation over the
other.8' This determination departs from the Houghton test by finding
historical approval amidst uncertainty. 2 Second, the instant Court ignored
the fact that history alone neither justifies finding a seizure reasonable nor
acts as a buffer to constitutional scrutiny.83
In light of the foregoing, the instant Court should have balanced the
interests involved in the arrest as required by the second prong of the
Houghton test.8 In Houghton, the Court engaged in a balancing analysis
even though the historical inquiry produced an answer indicating the
reasonableness of passenger property searches." Thus, it is inconsistent
that the instant Court categorically declined the application of a balancing
test.86 The instant Court's decision, hence, suffers from an incomplete
analysis.
To further support its decision declining to balance all factors, the
instant Court adopted the Whren rule, 7 permitting the use of a balancing
test in the presence of probable cause only when the seizure is
extraordinary.88 However, the instant Court's analysis is again incomplete.
Other than the common existence of probable cause, the instant Court
insufficiently analogized the two cases to justify a full custodial arrest for
a seatbelt violation on the same rationale used to justify a traffic stop. 89
The levels of intrusion in each case, namely the mere temporary
detention of a motorist for a traffic violation in Whren compared with a full
custodial arrest for a seatbelt violation in the instant case, are disparate
enough to support the argument that while the former is not extraordinary,
the same cannot be said of the latter. 90 The reasonableness of an arrest for
a seatbelt violation is questionable in view of the legislature's

81. Id.

82. Justice O'Connor alludes to this point by highlighting that the majority's own analysis
indicates that common-law history is equivocal. See id. at 361 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). But see
supra note 56 and accompanying text. The fact that the instant Court found American approval of

warrantless misdemeanor arrests, however, is undercut by the ambiguity present at English common
law. See id. at 327, 336.
83. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
84. See Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299-300 (1999).
85. See id, at 303-04. This may suggest selective use of the balancing test by the Court.
86. See Atwater, 532 U.S. at 354 (citing Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200,208 (1979)).
87. See ia
88. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818 (1996).
89. See Atwater, 532 U.S. at 363 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
90. See id. at 363-64 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor distinguished Whren from
the instant case by emphasizing that the issue in Whren involved the subjective intent of a police
officer in executing a traffic stop. Id. at 363 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Whren, 517 U.S.
at 808). Whren did not consider, as did the instant case, the constitutionality of arrests for fine-only
offenses. See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). A traffic violation, as Justice O'Connor pointed out,
is much less intrusive than a full custodial arrest. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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determination that a fine would equally serve the state's purpose.91 This
leads to the conclusion that a full custodial arrest for falling to wear a
seatbelt is a punishment disproportional to the offense, 92 and thus, contrary
to the instant Court's holding, is extraordinary. By categorically applying
the Whren doctrine to the instant case, the instant Court ignored Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence requiring the consideration of all factors
surrounding the seizure. 93
Alternatively, the instant Court could have relied on Whren to create a
new category of extraordinary seizures notwithstanding the existence of
probable cause. The Court in Whren specifically stated that there are "rare
exceptions" where probable cause casts doubt on the reasonableness of a
search or seizure.94 The instant Court could have taken this opportunity to
define misdemeanor seatbelt arrests, even upon probable cause, as one of
these "rare exceptions" alluded to in Whren,95 and addressed why with an
eye toward the facts of the instant case.96
The instant Court's holding, however, is tailored more to the
formulation of a bright-line rule for warrantless misdemeanor arrests,97
rather than dealing with the reasonableness of Petitioner's own arrest.
Although increasing the administrability of law enforcement is a legitimate
concern, it does not absolve the instant Court from its obligation to
Petitioner, and to the Constitution, to safeguard the Fourth Amendment
right to be free from unreasonable seizures.98 The effect of the instant
Court's rule is to curtail litigation stemming from police conduct on the
field. 99 The adverse result of the instant Court's holding, however, is that

91. Id. at 365 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). A fine would serve the same purpose in effecting
the government's interest in forcing Petitioner to appear at court and to increase child safety laws.
See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Alternatively, in lieu of allowing arrest for the seatbelt violation,
the legislature could consider increasing the fine to increase its adherence by motorists.

92. See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
93. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968) (citing Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310

(1967) (Fortas, J., concurring)).
94. Whren, 517 U.S. at 817.
95. Seeid.
96. Accordingly, the instant Court would have met the Fourth Amendment's requirement that
each case be dealt with by considering the specific factors surrounding the incident.
97. See Atwater, 532 U.S. at 361 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
98. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 15; see alsoAtwater, 532 U.S. at 366 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
("While clarity is certainly a value worthy of consideration in our Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, it by no means trumps the values of liberty and privacy at the heart of the
Amendment's protections.").
99. See Atwater, 532 U.S. at 346-47. The creation of a rule allowing warrantless
misdemeanor arrests protects police officers from suits premised on the abuse of their discretion.
However, as Justice O'Connor noted, police officers are already protected from such suits by the
doctrine of qualified immunity. Id. at 367 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also Anderson v.
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638-41 (1987) (describing the protection qualified immunity affords to
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it takes away the individual's right to specifically challenge a misdemeanor
arrest as unreasonable in a court of law.' 00 Contrary to the proposition
stated in Whren, indicating that categorical treatment of arrests gives way
to specific analysis when the seizure is unreasonable, 10 ' the Court in the
instant case deprived Petitioner of the benefit of such individualized
analysis." ° 2
Although the instant holding can be read as increasing consistency in
the application of law enforcement, it also can be read as decreasing the
protections once solidly secured by the Fourth Amendment. The instant
Court has given the police unbridled power to arrest an ordinary citizen for
merely violating any number of misdemeanors, regardless of the actual
need to arrest. Undoubtedly, the instant Court has paved the path to police
abuse by affording law enforcement officials unlimited discretion.'0 3 In
creating an "easily administrable" rule for warrantless misdemeanor
arrests, the instant Court has excused police officers from using common
sense in carrying out their duties. Most disturbing, however, is that the
instant Court has denied the people the right to challenge such arrests
executed on less than common sense. In holding that probable cause alone,
without considering the facts surrounding the seizure, justifies warrantless
misdemeanor arrests, the instant Court has strayed from the traditional
case-by-case adjudication on which Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
rests. While the instant holding significantly lowers the level of protection
available to the individual from unreasonable seizures, the instant Court
ultimately alters the extent to which the judiciary safeguards the
Constitution itself.

a police officer who can prove that a reasonable officer in the same situation could have believed
that the search was permissible under the Fourth Amendment).
100. See Atwater, 532 U.S. at 350. The instant Court's holding eradicates any legal basis for
challenging an arrest based solely on the violation of a misdemeanor, which will usually be
unreasonable in the absence of any need to detain the offender. See supra note 71 and
accompanying text.
101. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 352-53 (quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806,818 (1996)).
102. See id. at 354-55.
103. Id. at 372 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (describing how the instant Court's opinion allows
police to arrest simply for the purposes of harassing an individual, thus creating the potential for
further racial discrimination by police).
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